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IN THE SUPRE~lli COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
V. Case No. 16422 
RANDOLPH CRAIG, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~NT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Randolph Craig, appeals from a conviction of 
Aggravated Robbery rendered in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery and the dismissal of those charges against him. 
Counsel on appeal, ANDREW A. VALDEZ, submits this brief in 
compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's conviction 
reversed and to have the case remanded to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a new trial, or in the alternative, to have 
the matter dismissed. 
STATEXENT OF THE FACTS 
Between 2:30a.m. and 3:00a.m. on July 6, 1978, the 
7-Eleven Store at 9th South and Fifth East, in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, was robbed of approximately $150.00. (R.82) 
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by two black men alleged to be wearing tank tops. (R. 23) 
After producing money from the register, the assistant 
manager of the store, Robert Skelton, was injured by a 
blow to the head with a weapon. State's witness, Sargeant 
Allan B. Clark, testified that he was dispatched on July 6th 
in the early morning hours to look for two male blacks who 
were seen proceeding north on 400 East in the vicinity of 
Eighth to Seventh South. As Officer Clark crossed Sixth 
South southbound on 500 East he observed two individuals 
cross the intersection of Sixth South and Forth East. Officer 
Clark could not give a description of the two; he could only 
ascertain they were two male negroes. The officer made a 
U-turn, went west on Sixth South until he could see north on 
Fourth East, and did not see anybody. (R. 52, 53, 54, 55) 
It was the testimony of Officer Charles Cockayne that 
at approximately 5:00a.m. on July 6th he observed an object 
which looked like a form of a man in a field on Fourth East 
and Sixth South. Only one such subject was seen. (R. 57, 58) 
The officer ran towards the object and pointed the location 
to two other officers, who were moving towards the field, 
and told the suspect to freeze. Officer Cockayne further 
testified that one of the other officers then stated that 
another individual was leaving the area. Officer Cockayne 
did not observe anyone else leave the area. (R. 55, 59) 
After the> suspect was apprehended Officer Cockayne and other 
officers conducted a yard to yard search of the area. (R 60. 
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Approximately one half hour to forty-five minutes after 
the initial observance of the apprehended individual, Officer 
Cockayne finds Randolph Craie crouching near a bush at an 
estimated distance of 150 yards away from the field. Mr. 
Craig was wearing a denim cap, a black leather jacket, 
shoes, and shirt. (R. 62, 63) Mr. Craig was not wearing 
a tank top, did not have any weapon, no evidence was found 
on Mr. Craig or in the area to connect him with the 7-11 
robbery. (R. 69, 70) 
At trial the 7-ll employee, Robert Skelton, testified 
that on the night of the robbery he gave the following 
description of Mr. Craig: A. six foot tall; B. wearing a 
black leather jacket; C. Negro race; D. Beret. (R. 97, 99) 
However, he further testified that the black leather jacket 
and hat found on Mr. Craig when arrested July 6th, were not 
the same leather jacket and hat the robber wore. Moreover, 
Mr. S~elton testified at trial that he saw Mr. Craig on three 
occassions on July 6th. First. Mr. Craig came in the 7-11 to 
purchase items with another black male. Mr. Skelton remembered 
each specific item purchased. Mr. Craig was there for five 
minutes. Second Mr. Craig was near the phone booth in front 
of the store. Third: during the course of the robbery. 
Each time Mr. Craig, according to Mr. Skelton, was without a 
mask and wearing a black leather jacket, beret, and tank top. 
(R 97, 98, 99) Further, Mr. Skelton admitted under oath 
that prior to ~r. Craig's preliminary hearing, a line-up 
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was held at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in which Mr. 
Craig, with others, was brought face to face with Skelton 
to determine if Mr. Skelton could identify individuals 
who robbed the 7-11 store on July 6th. Mr. Skelton stated 
at the line-up there was nobody there (R. 100, 101, 103). 
Mr. Skelton further testified that because Mr. Craig is near 
the co-defendant in court, it helps to "jar" his memory 
and aids him to identify Mr. Craig. (R. 124, 125) 
It was the testimony of Patrick Coco Williams, who had 
pled guilty to the charge of the lesser offense of Robbery 
of the 7-11 store (R. 18) ,that he did not know Mr. Craig on 
July 6. 1978. 
Defendant Randolph Craig testified in his own behalf 
that he was hitchhiking from San Francisco to New York and 
arrived in Salt Lake on July 3, 1978. On July 5th, he was 
sitting in the Greyhound Bus Station with the intent to sleep 
there overnight and leave Salt Lake in the morning. At 
midnight Mr. Craig was asked to leave because he did not 
have a ticket and had spent the two nights before at the 
bus station. Mr. Craig then went to Howard Johnson's up 
the street for about one hour, and had coffee and a doughnut 
He then went outside in front of the hotel and sat for awhile. 
Mr. Craig met an individual who was drinking beer and asked 
him for a beer and for a place to sleep. The individual and 
Mr. Craig drank some beer and rode around town for some time. 
The individual dropped Mr. Crai~ off at Liberty Park so Craig 
could sleep in the park at approximately 3 00 to 3 30 G m , 
-4-
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July 6th Mr. Craig testified that he remained in the park 
for a couple of hours and that he had left his luggage at 
the Continental Trailway Bus Depot in a locker. Craig further 
verified that defendant's Exhibit 16-D was the key found 
on him when arrested on July 6th, and belonged to the locker 
where he placed his luggage. Furthermore, Craig stated,at 
trial.he left the park at approximately 5:00 to 5:30a.m. and 
was walking towards Continental Trialways when he observed 
several police cars zooming up and down the street. Mr. 
Craig wanted to avoid being hassled by them and so he stood 
and leaned by a house. He was subsequently discovered by 
the police and arrested. Randol?h Craig further stated 
he did not know the co-defendant, was not in the vacant field 
where Mr. Williams was apprehended, and did not rob the 7-11 
store on July 6th, 1978, at approximately 2:45 a.m. (R. 133-139) 
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the case against the 
defendant or in the alternative for a direct verdict upon 
the state resting. Both motions were denied. (R. 129-131) 
Upon the defense resting defense counsel renewed 
defendant's motion to dismiss and for a directed verdict. 
Judge Banks stated he had some doubt as to Mr. Craig's 
guilt, but again denied both motions. (R. 168, 169) 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AT 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE AND IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY 
BECAUSE THERE HAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE DEFENDANT'S 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
This Court has on several occassions stated the rules 
concerning the granting of a new trial on the basis that the 
verdict was not supported by the evidence. In State v. Cooper, 
114 Ut. 531, 201 P 2d 764,770 (1949), this Court stated 
The question of granting or denying a 
motion for a new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
This court cannot substitute its discretion 
for that of the trial court. We do not 
ordinarily interfere with the rulings of 
the trial court in either granting or 
denying a new trial, and unless abuse of, 
or failure to exercise, discretion on the 
part of the trial judge is quite clearly 
shown, the ruling of the trial court will 
be sustained. 
It is apparent that t~1is Court does have the power to 
order a new trial in appropriate cases. This Court has said 
that: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule 
that it is the province of the jury to 
weigh the testimony and determine the 
facts. Nevertheless, we cannot escape 
the responsibilityof judgment upon whether 
under the evidence, a jury could, and with 
reason, conclude the defendant's guilt 
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Williams, 111 Ut. 379, 180 P. 2d 
551, 555 (1947). 
-6-
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A criminal defendant's motion to dismiss must be 
granted by the trial court thereby keeping from the deliberation 
of the jury the question of the defendant's guilt unless 
the prosecution has introduced substantial evidence of the 
defendant's guilt. For a question of guilt to go to a 
jury, it is not enough that the State merely introduce 
substantial evidence that an Aggravated Robbery has been 
committed. The State must also show by substantial evidence 
that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. 
The Utah Supreme Court in a least two cases, Seybold 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah 6, 239 P.2d 174, 
177 (1951). and Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Stewart, 
4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 892, has cited the proper test 
for determining whether or not the State has born its burden. 
The Sevbold and Continental Bank cases both rely on the 
test developed by Wigmore, 9 Wigmore 3d Ed. Section 2494, 
to set the standard of proof which must be met by the prosecution. 
As cited in both cases: 
"' (The proposition) cannot be, is there 
evidence? . . The proposition seems to 
me to be this: Are there facts in evidence 
which, if unanswered, would justify men of 
ordinary reason and fairness in affirming 
the question which the Plaintiff is bound 
to maintain."' 
In the criminal case of State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 167, 
355 P.2d 57 (1960). the Supreme Court also delineated the 
standard which should be utilized by the trial court in determining 
whether or not the prosecution has met its burden of 
introducing substantial evidence of a defendant's guilt. 
-7-
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The opinion in Garcia states: 
It is universally recognized that there 
is no jury question without substantial 
evidence indicating defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This requires 
evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably find the defendant guilty of all 
material issues of fact beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Supra at 59. 
In the instant case appellant contends that but for 
appellant being black and unfortunately cast to stand trial 
amongst two black co-defendants, no jury could have 
reasonably and fairly have found the appellant guilty given 
the insubstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. 
The appellant asserts that the question of guilt 
rests on the identification by Robert Skelton. Mr. Skelton 
was not able to identify Mr. Craig when Mr. Craig was not 
present in a courtroom seated with two other black males who 
were also defendants in this matter. Furthermore, each time 
Mr. Craig was identified he and the other two black males 
were the only black people in the room. Moreover, Mr. Skelton 
at a line-up was more definite that there was nobody there 
he could recognize. Appellant was, in fact, in the line-up, 
he was not hidden behind others, he was taller than any others 
in the line-up, and looked sufficiently different from the 
rest. 
Furthermore, appellant contends that taken in its 
entirety the State did not meet its burden of introducing 
substantial evidence of defendant's guilt. The St~te presente~ 
-8-
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no evidence other than the tainted identification and the 
presence of the defendant in an area where another suspect 
was apprehended. This in itself is not substantial evidence 
that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. In the 
instant case Mr. Craig's presence is contrasted by the conflict 
in police officers testimony as to whether there was 
anybody, in fact, who fled the area. Additional contrasts 
were: the clothing appellant was wearing and the clothing 
described by the victim, plus the inability of the victim to 
recognize the clothing as the same; no evidence to connect 
appellant with the robbery was found on appellant or in the 
area of his arrest; the appellant's own testimony that he had 
not been at the 7-ll, but was hitchhiking through Salt Lake and 
was on his way to a bus depot where he had locked his 
luggage, plus the further corroboration of appellant's 
testimony, i.e. presentation to the Court of the key to the 
locker where his luggage was stored. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the prosecution made a substantial showing 
that there had been an Aggravated Robbery at the 7-ll Store, 
:he State failed to show by substantial evidence that the 
defendant was involved in the commission of that offense. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions 
to dismiss and submitting the case to the jury. Appellant 
-9-
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asserts that the conviction should be reversed or, in the 
alternative, appellant should be granted a new trial. 
-10-
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDREW A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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